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iv

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section
78-2a-3(2)(b)(i) of the Utah Code Annotated (1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court correctly determined that the Summit County

Board of Adjustment's interpretation of the Snyderville Basin Development Code was
purely a question of law to be reviewed for correctness? (R. 3 6 5 - 6 6 , 3 6 9 , 3 7 5 - 7 8 ,
427-30). The trial court's interpretation of the law is reviewed for correctness. State
v. Pena. 8 6 9 P.2d 9 3 2 , 9 3 6 (Utah 1994); Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City
Co., 8 7 0 P.2d 8 8 0 , 885 (Utah 1993); T o w n of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 8 3 6 P.2d
7 9 7 , 8 0 0 (Utah App. 1992).
II.

Whether the trial court correctly determined, as a matter of law, that the

Snyderville Basin Development Code does not require a formal site plan approval
process as a prerequisite for obtaining a Building Permit for a permitted use within the
Resort Commercial Zone District? (R. 365-66, 3 6 9 , 378-89, 427-30). The trial court's
interpretations of local ordinances is reviewed for correctness while the Board of
Adjustment's decision is reviewed for a determination of whether the decision was
arbitrary, capricious or illegal based upon the substantial evidence in the administrative
record. Webb v. Ninow. 883 P.2d 1365, 1376 (Utah App. 1994); Town of Alta, 836
P.2d at 8 0 0 ; Pena, 869 P.2d at 9 3 6 ; Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment,
8 9 3 P.2d 6 0 2 , 6 0 3 - 0 4 (Utah App. 1995).
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The determinative statutes and rules include (i) Sections 17-27-708 and 17-271001 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953 f as amended), set forth in Addendum A to
Appellant's Brief; (ii) the Snyderville Basin Development Code, set forth in full in the
Addendum to Appellee's Brief; (iii) the Snyderville Basin Administrative Guidelines,
Resolution 9 3 - 1 , set forth in the Addendum to Appellee's Brief; and (iv) Rule 56 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, set forth in Addendum D to Appellant's Brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises from Plaintiff and Appellee Red Barn Development, L.C.'s ("Red
Barn") petition for judicial review of the Summit County Board of Adjustment's ("Board
of Adjustment" or "Board")

denial of Red Barn's application for a building permit

based upon the Board of Adjustment's interpretation of the Snyderville Basin
Development Code (the "Development Code").

The Board of Adjustment had

previously denied Red Barn's request for a building permit and upheld the Director of
Community Development's (the "Director") decision that a preliminary and final site
plan approval was required for the permitted use intended by Red Barn. (R. 9).
Red Barn filed a Complaint seeking judicial review by the Third District Court of
Summit County of the Board of Adjustment's decision (R. 1-11). Both Red Barn and
Summit County filed motions for summary judgment (R. 36-37, 4 1 - 3 6 0 , 365-66, 36990).

After hearing oral argument by both counsel and reviewing the respective

motions and memorandum in support of the motions for summary judgment, the trial
court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, thereby granting Red
Barn's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Summit County's Motion for
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Summary Judgment (R. 427-30). From this Order, dated October 2 9 , 1 9 9 7 , Summit
County has appealed (R. 431-33).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Red Barn is the owner of real property located at 4 1 3 7 North Highway 2 2 4
(West Side) , Summit Count, Utah. Red Barn intends to construct on that property 15
lodge type buildings consisting of 57 Units which would be rented on a nightly or
periodic basis. Red Barn does not currently intend to divide ownership of any portion
of the real property. (R. 303). Red Barn's intended use of the property is a Permitted
Use with a "Resort Commercial" Zone as set forth in the Development Code (R. 303).
The Development Code sets forth the procedures for obtaining building permits
within the Snyderville Basin and in doing so sets forth differing procedures depending
upon whether the development is a permitted use or a conditional use within certain
zones.
Section 3.1 (b) (8) of the Development Code provides:
The RC [Resort Commercial] Zoning District is designed to
accommodate retail commercial and residential uses oriented to
major destination resort development including resort retail ships,
grocery stores, restaurants, condominiums, overnight lodging units
and comparable resort facilities and services, (emphasis added)
(R. 210-11). There is no dispute that Red Barn's intended use of the property is a
permitted use (R. 9-10, 33).
Section 3.5 (d) of the Development Code specifies in pertinent part as follows:
Limitation on Uses. Uses shall be limited to those identified in the
Schedule of Uses as a Permitted Use or Conditional Use. . . .
(R. 208).
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Section 3.6, identifying the Schedule of Uses provides as follows:
(a) Schedule of-Efifmitifid-Uses. Tho Schedule of Permittnd Uses
("Schedule") prescribes the allowable uses within each zoning
district. The purposes of the Schedule of J?s£mi££ed~ Uses is to
implement the Land use policies of the General Plan, Land Use
Element. The Permitted Uses, Conditional Uses, Non-designated
Uses, and Prohibited Uses within each zoning district shall be as
prescribed in the Schedule. . . . The following rules shall be used
to interpret the Schedule of-Pefm^ted Uses:
(1) If the Symbol "P" appears in the cell, the use is permitted
subject to the general requirements for specified uses within the
zoning district, this Chapter, and the applicable performance
standards set forth in Chapter 5 of this Code. No permitted use
shall be established until all required permits are obtained including, at a minimum, a-fetttteto^ development permit.
(2)
permitted
standards
standards
standards
use.

If the Symbol "C" appears in the cell, the use is only
subject to the conditional use permit procedures and
specified in Section 3.7 herein, the performance
set forth in Chapter 5 of this code and any other
set forth in this Code which may be applicable to such

(R. 207-08).
After prior submissions to Summit County, on March 2 1 , 1997, Red Barn made
a letter request for issuance of building permits and submitted w i t h that request an
Application for Final Site Plan Approval, as requested by Summit County (R. 3-4, 9).
The letter also requested the Director to notify Red Barn if additional information was
necessary to process the request. At the time of the application Red Barn paid all filing
fees necessary to process the application, even though Red Barn contended that an
Application for Final Site Plan Approval was not required for a permitted use pursuant
to the Development Code (R. 9).
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The Director responded by letter dated April 15, 1997 indicating that Red Barn's
application would be treated as a request for preliminary plat approval and that the
request for building permits would be denied.

The Director explained that it was

necessary for Red Barn to obtain both a preliminary and final site plan approval for the
permitted use.

The Director did not say that Red Barn would have to apply for

subdivision approval.

Summit County made no other objection to Red Barn's

Application (R. 1-2, 9).
Red Barn appealed the Director's decision to the Board of Adjustment asserting
that no preliminary plat or final plat approval was required for a permitted use under
the Development Code and that based upon the absence of any objection to Red
Barn's application, building permits should be immediately issued (R. 8). On May 2 2 ,
1997 and on June 19, 1 9 9 7 , after Red Barn and Summit County had submitted
written material and oral presentations to the Board of Adjustment, the Board of
Adjustment considered the appeal of Red Barn and determined by a vote of four (4)
to one (1) to uphold the Director's decision to deny Red Barn's application (R. 8, 5254, 254-388).

Thereafter, Red Barn filed a Complaint in the Summit County Third

District Court seeking review of the Board of Adjustment's decision (R. 1-11).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Red Barn's argument on appeal is divided into t w o sections. The first section
addresses whether the trial court employed the proper standard for reviewing the
Board of Adjustment's decision.

While Summit County claims on appeal that the

Board of Adjustment's decision "carries a statutory presumption of validity and is
afforded broad judicial deference" (Appellant's Brief at 17), Summit County entirely
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fails to address the fact that the Board of Adjustment's decision was purely an
interpretation of the Development Code, which is a question of law reviewed for
correctness. It is the position of Red Barn that the interpretation of a county ordinance
is a question of law which courts uniformly review for correctness. Accordingly, it
was entirely proper for the trial court to review the Board of Adjustment's decision for
correctness without affording deference to the Board's findings.
The second section of Red Barn's argument concerns the correct interpretation
of the Development Code.

Red Barn contends, and the trial court agreed, that the

Development Code does not require a preliminary site plan and final site plan approval
process for a development which is a permitted use within the applicable zone. The
Development

Code is clearly divided into portions which specifically refer to

requirements for uses which are permitted and uses which are conditional within the
applicable zone. Those portions of the Development Code which specifically refer to
permitted uses do not require a preliminary or final site plan approval process.
Conversely, Summit County attempts to rewrite the Development Code, through
its tortured interpretation, so as to impose requirements upon Red Barn which are not
contained within the plain language of the Development Code. By so interpreting the
Development Code, the Board of Adjustment has acted in a manner which is contrary
to law. The Development Code does not require Red Barn to go through the lengthy
process of obtaining preliminary and final site plan approval prior to obtaining building
permits.

Therefore, it was an illegal act of Summit County to hold Red Barn to a

standard which was not imposed by law and the trial court properly reversed the Board
of Adjustment's decision.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REVIEWED THE BOARD OF
ADJUSTMENT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT CODE FOR CORRECTNESS.

Summit County asserts, and Red Barn agrees that when reviewing the decision
of a board of adjustment, a trial court may determine "only whether or not the decision
is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." (emphasis added) U.C.A. § 17-27-1001(3) (1953,
as amended). The distinction Summit County consistently fails to make, however, is
that when determining whether the Board of Adjustment's interpretation of the county
ordinance was illegal, the trial court's review of the interpretation is for correctness.
If the Board of Adjustment incorrectly interpreted the county ordinance, application of
the ordinance under an incorrect interpretation is illegal.
As this Court determined in Patterson vs. Utah County Board of Adjustment, ,
"whether or not the Board's decision is illegal depends on a proper interpretation and
application of the law."

8 9 3 P.2d 6 0 2 , 6 0 4 (Utah App. 1995).

In Patterson, this

Court stated that whether the Board's decision was illegal was a matter for the court's
determination for which no deference was given to the board or to the trial court. Id.
Interpretation of an ordinance is a matter of law which is in the province of the courts,
not the executive branch of government.
Clearly, in matters where a trial court is considering whether a board of
adjustment has acted arbitrarily or capriciously, the trial court must affirm the board's
actions if supported by substantial evidence. In the present controversy however, the
trial court was not reviewing a factual determination made by the Board of Adjustment, the trial court was reviewing only the Board's interpretation of the Development
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Code. The proper interpretation and application of the Development Code-or whether
the Board acted illegally—is a function for the courts for which no deference is given
to the Board of Adjustment. Patterson, 8 9 3 P.2d at 6 0 2 .
While Summit County correctly cites that Board actions are accorded substantial
deference and will be rejected on appeal only if they are so unreasonable as to be
arbitrary and capricious or if they violate the law (Appellant's Brief at 21), and that the
trial court "cannot substitute its o w n views and conclusions for that of the Board, as
it relates to its exercise of discretion in land use decisions" (R. 354), Summit County's
reliance upon these stated principals is simply misplaced. The Utah Supreme Court
reject the identical argument in the matter of Sandy City vs. Salt Lake County, 827
P.2d. 2 1 2 (Utah 1992).
In Sandy City, the trial court first and the Utah Supreme Court second were
required to interpret sections of the Utah Code regarding the development of land in
unincorporated areas adjacent to municipalities. The Utah Supreme Court stated:
Furthermore, we note that the County errs in cautioning us
to defer to the board of county commissioners' legal conclusion
that the Chevron project and the larger commercial subdivision of
which it is only one part are not urban development under section
1 0 - 2 - 4 1 8 . This is not a case in which we are attempting to
second-guess the County's lawful exercise of legislatively delegated discretion. [Citations omitted.] In this case, w e are deciding
whether the County overstepped the bounds of its legislatively
delegated authority. The interpretation of section 10-2-418 and
10-1-104 . . . are pure questions of law. The County's technical
experience in planning and zoning is of no relevance in deciding
these legal issues.
827 P.2d at 2 1 8 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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A similar conclusion was reached by the Utah Court of Appeals in Town of Alta
v. Ben Hame Corporation, 836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1992). When interpreting a Salt
Lake County Ordinance, the Court stated:
Just as the interpretation of a statute or zoning ordinance is a
question of law for the Court, the determination of what uses are
accessory uses customarily incidental to a single-family dwelling
is a question of law.
id. (citations omitted). The Court in Alta noted earlier in its opinion that "We accord
conclusions of law no particular deference but review them for correctness."

Thus

it follows that if the appellate court provides no deference to the trial court for its
conclusions of law (including the interpretation of County zoning ordinances), the trial
court likewise provides no deference to conclusions of law made by the Board of
Adjustment. See also Beaver County vs. Utah State Tax Commission, 9 1 6 P.2d 3 4 4
(Utah 1996); Patterson, 8 9 3 P.2d at 6 0 5 .
Thus, the trial court was free to determine, without deference to the Board of
Adjustment or its reasoning, the proper interpretation of the requirements of the
Development Code for a permitted use. Interpretation of the Development Code is a
"pure question of law."

No presumption exists in favor of the decision of the Board

of Adjustments and it would be improper to simply determine if substantial evidence
existed to support this conclusion of law.
Summit County's attempts, in its appellate brief, to distinguish the applicable
law cited by Red Barn is likewise misguided. While the cases Alta, Sandy City, and
Beaver County do not involve decisions of boards of adjustment, they do involve the
interpretation of law, as did Patterson. And as set forth in Patterson, there can be no
dispute that a question involving the proper interpretation of an ordinance is a question
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of law for which no deference is accorded to the Board. Clearly, it was appropriate
for the trial court to review the record before the Board of Adjustment without
affording any deference to the Board's erroneous interpretation of the Development
Code.
II.

A.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE
SNYDERVILLE BASIN DEVELOPMENT CODE DOES NOT
REQUIRE RED BARN'S PROJECT, A PERMITTED USE
WITHIN THE RESORT COMMERCIAL ZONE, TO SUBMIT
TO A PRELIMINARY SITE PLAN AND FINAL SITE PLAN
APPROVAL PROCESS.

Statutory Construction of the Snyderville Basin Development Code.
Summit County begins Section II of its brief by reciting five "rules" of statutory

construction which bear on the interpretation of an ordinance. Red Barn concurs with
four of the five "rules" cited by Summit County:
(i) "the interpretation must be based on the intent of the legislative body
enacting the ordinance," which intent is "ascertained from the plain
language of the ordinance;" (ii) "the ordinance must be construed as a
whole to give effect to the overall policy or general purpose which it is
intended to promote;" (iii) "an interpretation should be avoided if it
renders any part of the ordinance meaningless, superfluous, void or
insignificant;" and (iv) "a provision treating a matter specifically prevails
over an incidental reference made thereto in a provision treating another
issue."
(Appellant's Brief at 29-31 ).1 These rules of construction only support the trial court's
conclusion that the Development Code is clear in its distinction that preliminary and

*Red Barn does not agree with Summit County's fifth "rule" of construction~if a term is not
defined it is appropriate to rely on the interpretation of that term by local zoning officials and that if
a term is ambiguous, the zoning agency's interpretation should control if reasonable and sensible
(Appellant's Brief at 31). Red Barn contends that this "rule" is irrelevant for three reasons: (i) the
Development Code is not ambiguous, but rather clear and unequivocal; (ii) there is no Utah law to
support the contention that an undefined term should be defined by the local zoning officials; and
(iii) if the Development Code is ambiguous, it should be construed in favor of the landowner
Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment. 893 P.2d 602, 603-04 (Utah App. 1995).
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final site plan approval is not required for a permitted use (R. 429). Plaintiff contends
that the Development Code is not ambiguous regarding the absence of any required
site plan approval for a permitted use.

If an ambiguity exists, it is created by the

Defendant ignoring the express language of the Development Code.
B.

The Snyderville Basin Development Code Does Not Require Preliminary and Final

Site Plan Approval for a Permitted Use.
Section 3.5

of the

Development

Code identifies

appropriate

compatible uses within various zones established by the Development

and

Code.

According to subparagraph (d) of Section 3.5, Allowable Uses shall be those set forth
in Schedules contained in Section 3.6, which are then categorized as either a permitted
use or a conditional use (R. 208). Section 3.6(a) specifies as follows:
The following rules shall be used to interpret the Schedule of Uses:
(1) If the Symbol "P" appears in the cell, the use is permitted
subject to the general requirements for specified uses within the
zoning district, this Chapter [Chapter 3 ] , and the applicable
performance standards set forth in Chapter 5 of this Code. No
permitted use shall be established until all required permits are
obtained including, at a minimum, a development permit.
2) If the symbol "C" appears in the cell, the use is permitted
subject to the conditional use permit procedures and standards
specified in Section 3.7 herein, the performance standards set
forth in Chapter 5 of this code, and any other standards set forth
in this Code which may be applicable to such use.
(R. 208-09).

Relying expressly upon the requirements of the foregoing Section, a

permitted use is subject only to the requirements of Chapter 3 and the general
requirements for specified uses, while a conditional use requires compliance with the
additional standards of Section 3.7 (and by incorporation Section 4.6).

Again the

intended use of Red Barn's property is a permitted use, not a conditional use. The
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requirements of Chapter 4 of the Development Code are, therefore, inapplicable to a
permitted use.
If the intended use of the Red Barn property were a conditional use, and it is
not. Red Barn would be required to comply with the provisions of Section 3.7. Section
3.7 (R. 202-04) specifies in express terms that a conditional use shall not be
established until a site plan has been approved (specifically referring to Section 4.6),
and then only after review and recommendation by the Planning Commission and
approval by the Board of County Commission (Sections 3.7 (b) and (c)). No similar
express provision exists for a permitted use which requires either the approval of a site
plan or approval before the Planning Commission or the Board of County Commission.
To the contrary, the express language of Section 4.6 defining requirements for
Site Plans provides as follows:
(a) Applicability. The following applications shall be required
to obtain site plan approval:
(1) Requests for zoning map amendments to mixed
use, commercial, or industrial zoning districts; and
(2)

Requests for conditional use approval.

(R. 176-77). In this case, the Summit County Development Office and the Board of
Adjustments ignored the express language of the Development Code to require a Site
Plan approval (both preliminary and final) for Red Barn's permitted use.
Although factually different from the present case, the Utah Court of Appeals
held in Logan City vs. Huber. 7 8 6 P.2d 1 3 7 2 , 1377 (Utah App. 1990) that it would
not "rewrite a statute or ignore its plain language to reach a constitutional
construction." When interpreting the Development Code in this case, Summit County
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would have the trial court and this Court ignore the express language of Sections 3.6,
3.7 and 4.6 which is unambiguous and does not require site plan approval for a
permitted use.

"When divining the meaning of . . . statutes, it is reasonable to

interpret terms so that the language used makes sense when taken as a whole."
Wright v. University of Utah. 8 7 6 P.2d 3 8 0 , 3 8 4 (Utah App. 1994). To require Red
Barn to obtain a site plan approval makes the language of the foregoing Sections
nonsensical. Summit County's position that Red Barn must have a site plan approval
is, therefore, unsupportable.
C.

Where the Plain Language of the Development Code is Clear. This Court Should

Not Look Beyond the Same to Divine Intent.
Utah appellate courts "are guided by the rule that a statute [or ordinance] should
generally be construed according to its plain language." Brendle v. City of Draper. 937
P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah App. 1997): see also Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth. 779 P.2d 6 8 5 ,
686 (Utah 1989): Salt Lake Therapy Clinic v. Frederick. 8 9 0 P.2d 1 0 1 7 , 1020 (Utah
1995) ("When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it
expresses, and no room is left for construction.").

Furthermore, in Patterson, this

Court stated:
[Blecause zoning ordinances are in derogation of a property
owner's common-law right to unrestricted use of his or her
property, provisions therein restricting property uses should be
strictly constructed, and provisions permitting property uses
should be liberally construed in favor of the property owner.
898 P.2d 6 0 2 , 6 0 6 . Rather than accepting this time honored principle of construction,
Summit County attempts to persuade this Court to look to the provisions set forth in
Chapter 4 of the Development Code-which clearly does not apply to permitted
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uses—as well as other irrelevant sections of the Development Code and the Snyderville
Basin Administrative Guidelines (the "Guidelines") in order to impose requirements upon
Red Barn which simply do not exist. Summit County's rationale for citing irrelevant
portions of the Development Code and Guidelines as well as outside authorities is that
"the ordinance must be construed as a whole to give effect to the overall policy or
general purpose," and if a term is undefined or ambiguous, "it is appropriate to rely on
the interpretation of that term by the local zoning officials" and "the zoning agency's
interpretation should control." (Appellant's Brief at 30-31). However, these principles
simply do not apply where the Development Code is not ambiguous.
(1)

Chapter 4 of the Development Code is not applicable to a Permitted Use.

Summit County contends that certain sections of Chapter 4 of the Development Code
dictate the requirements for Red Barn to obtain a building permit, when in reality, they
do not. Ignoring, temporarily, Red Barn's assertions that Chapter 4 has no application
to a permitted use, examination of Summit County's assertion that Section 4.12 (b)
controls the requirements for issuance of a building permit, suggests the absurdity of
Summit County's interpretation of the Development Code. 2 This Section states in
pertinent part that "[a]ny applicant for a building permit shall submit an approved final
site plan, final subdivision plat, and if applicable, a conditional use permit. . . ." (R.
172). Thus, if Chapter 4 applies to Red Barn's permitted use, it would also require
every other applicant for a building permit, including one applying for a building permit
for a residential home located in a previously approved subdivision, to obtain an

2

Summit County also relies upon essentially identical language of Section 12.2(1) of the
Administrative Guidelines which pursuant to Section 2 are non-binding upon Summit County.
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approved final site plan-meaning approval from the Planning Commission and the
Board of County Commissioners.

Summit County does not contend that a single

family applicant must obtain a site plan approval but asserts that the language of
Section 4 . 1 2

(b) is satisfied because most lots are located within

approved

subdivisions. 3 However, Defendant again ignores the express language of this Section
which states that at a minimum both an approved site plan and an approved
subdivision plat are required for a building permit. Again, the only logical reading of
this Section 4.12 and its additional requirements is in the context of a conditional use
permit, which requires additional requirements beyond those of a permitted use. (R.
172).
(2) Other provisions of Utah Law and the Development Code require building
permits. Summit County suggests that Section 4.12 must apply to Red Barn's project
since it is the section that refers to the requirements for building permits (Appellant's
Brief at 3 5 , 40). However, Section 4.12 is not the only reference in the Development
Code to building permits. As set forth in Section 3.6(a)(1), Red Barn concedes that
it must obtain a building permit and it must comply w i t h the applicable requirements
of Chapter 5 (R. 207-08).

Chapter 5 also defines the need for a building permit. 4

Section 5.17 (a) specifies that construction "of any building or structure or any part
thereof, including all structures or uses of which plans have been approved as part of

3

Summit County asserts that a single family applicant can file an Application for a Minor
Permit avoiding the requirements of this Section 4.12(b). However, Section 7.65 or 4.12 does not
exempt those requesting Minor Permits. Furthermore, Minor Permits do not expressly cover "Lots
of Record." Thus, it appears that the Director has arbitrarily excluded single family applicants from
the requirements of Section 4.12.
4

Section 17-27-1002 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) also sets forth the
requirement of a building permit.
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a rezoning, site plan, subdivision plat, conditional use permit or development
agreement, shall not be commenced until a building permit is obtained from the county
building inspector" (emphasis added) (R. 146). By reference to these requirements in
the disjunctive, the language of this Section clearly expresses an intent that one need
not have an approval if it is not required elsewhere. Since by the language of other
sections a rezoning, site plan, subdivision plat, conditional use permit or development
agreement is not necessary for Red Barn's intended use, a building permit must be
issued for a permitted use without further approval. Again, this Section must be read
in harmony w i t h the others. If Section 4 . 1 2 controls all circumstances for permitted
and conditional uses (even though it is inconsistent), there is no need for Section 5.17.
That was clearly not the intent of the Development Code.
(3) Section 6.14 of the Development Code is not applicable to this matter.
Summit County makes frequent reference in its appellate brief to Section 6.14(a)(1)
of the Development Code for the proposition that a final site plan is required before a
building permit is issued for a permitted use (Appellant's Brief at 3 7 , 39-40).
However, the language relied upon by Summit County has been taken out of context
of Chapter 6 of the Development Code. Section 6.14 is clearly found in the chapter
of the Development Code dealing only with subdivisions and public improvements (R.
139-43). Section 6.14(a) and 6.14(a)(1) provide as follows:
6.14

L.

Issuance of Building Permits and Certificates of
Occupancy
M
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been completed, or are part
of
an
improvement agreement as per Section 6.9 of
this Code, as attested to by the Director and
County Engineer and all applicable service
providers.
(1)

The Director may authorize building
permits for non-residential and multifamily dwellings provided that a final
site plan has been approved by the
County and construction plans have
been released by the County Engineer.

(R.140). Because Section 6.14(a)(1) is an exception to the general requirements of
Section 6.14(a) that all public improvements must first be competed before a permit
is issued, this Section has no application to the interpretation issue before the Court
and Summit County's reliance upon this section is unfounded.
(4) The Guidelines support Red Barn's and the trial court's interpretation of the
Development Code. Summit County's recitation of Section 12.2.1 of the Guidelines
does not support the plain language of the Development Code. In Appellant's brief,
Summit County contends that the Guidelines specifically require "either an approved
Final Site Plan or Final Subdivision Plat prior to issuance of a Building Permit"
(Appellant's Brief at 35-36). However, these guidelines are not binding. Section 2 of
the Guidelines expressly states that "these Administrative Guidelines shall not be
considered binding on the County . . . and shall not supersede any contrary provision
of the Snyderville Basin Development Code." (R. 82). Summit County, then, asserts
that the Guidelines are relevant in interpreting the Development Code, even though
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they are non-binding upon Summit County and Summit county's use of the Guidelines
is in direct conflict w i t h express provisions of the Development Code. 5
Red

Barn

asserts

that

other

provisions

of

the

Guidelines

support

its

interpretation. Section 4.4.3 of the Guidelines specifies in chart form the various type
of "development permits" provided in the Development Code and the time frames for
consideration and/or response by various bodies of the County. One such category is
that of a "Building Permit, use by right." (R. 8 0 , 413). For a "Building Permit, use of
right," proceedings before all bodies (including the Planning Commission and the Board
of County Commissions) except that of the Director is designated " n / a " , presumably
meaning not applicable.

This constitutes an expression of intent by the Board of

County Commissioners, w h o adopted the Guidelines, that a party applying for a
building permit for a use designated by right (a "permitted use") need not obtain a
preliminary or final site plan approval which would require an appearance before the
Planning Commission and/or the Board of County Commissioners. These Guidelines
are, therefore, consistent w i t h Red Barn's and the trial court's interpretation of the
Development Code, which is that a preliminary and final site plan approval process is
not required for a permitted use.
The plain language of the Development Code clearly sets forth the requirements
for obtaining a building permit for a permitted use. Morever, even if there is some
ambiguity in certain portions of the Development Code, the entire Development Code,

5

In Summit County's Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Summit
County asserts that the Guidelines require compliance (R. 397). It appears that Summit County
wishes the Guidelines to be binding upon citizens and non-binding upon the County.
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when read as a whole, clearly evidences the intent of the County to distinguish
between permitted uses and conditional uses when delineating the requirements for
obtaining a building permit.
D.

The Development Code Distinguishes Between Permitted Uses and Conditional

Uses.
Summit County devotes an entire section of their brief of appeal to the mistaken
proposition that the trial court somehow sua sponte amended and rewrote the
Development Code by adding t w o new definitions to the Development Code: a
"permitted use building permit/' and a "conditional use building permit."

(Appellant's

Brief at 44-46). Summit County is simply wrong in this assertion. The trial court did
not create new defined terms by referring to a permitted use building permit and a
conditional

use building permit

(R. 4 2 9 ) ; rather, the trial court was

merely

acknowledging that the Development Code distinguishes between permitted uses and
conditional uses. The trial court could have just as easily referred instead to a "building
permit for a permitted use" and a "building permit for a conditional use," without
changing the meaning of the trial court's conclusion.

The trial court's simple

truncation of its references to the different processes for obtaining a building permit
does not amount to legislation from the bench. Summit County's assertion that it
does is absurd and should be wholly disregarded by this Court.
Where the Development Code clearly does not require a site plan approval
process in order for Red Barn to obtain building permits to construct the Timberwolf
Lodge, the trial court was correct in so finding. Accordingly, this Court should affirm
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the trial court's interpretation of the Snyderville Basin Development Code and reject
Summit County's appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff/Appellee Red Barn respectfully requests that
this Court affirm the trial court's determination that the interpretation of the
Development Code is a matter of law properly reviewed for correctness and further
affirm the trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated October
29, 1998.
DATED this / /

day of Marohr+S^8.

^rrutt^

NNIS K. POOLE
^ ANDREA NUFFER GODFREY
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee Red Barn
Development, L.C.
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